The case for citizen duty by Mazor, Joseph
The case for citizen duty
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/101067/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Mazor, Joseph (2020) The case for citizen duty. Social Theory and Practice. ISSN 
0037-802X 
https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract20201676
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
Items deposited in LSE Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights 
reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private 
study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights 
holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is 
indicated by the licence information on the LSE Research Online record for the item.
1 
 
The Case for Citizen Duty 
Joseph Mazor 
Abstract: This article defends a novel type of institutionalized mass deliberation: Citizen Duty.  
Citizen Duty would legally require every citizen to engage in one day of diverse, moderated 
political deliberation prior to major elections.  This deliberation would realize a variety of 
benefits, including wiser electoral decisions and a more respectful electoral process, while 
avoiding the dangers of citizen deliberation.  A comparison with jury duty and with non-
deliberative alternatives suggests that Citizen Duty’s substantial economic and liberty costs are 
justified.  Finally, an examination of citizen attitudes towards politics and deliberation suggests 
that Citizen Duty is not as quixotic as it first appears. 
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A widely-accepted idea in contemporary democratic theory is that collectively-binding 
decisions are generally better—more legitimate, more respectful, more likely to produce good 
outcomes—if they are made after the right kind of deliberation.1 Yet citizens’ electoral choices, 
as collectively-binding and important as any other political decision, are often made with 
insufficient deliberation, especially across political lines. Several scholars, including Diana Mutz 
in Hearing the Other Side2 and Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin in Deliberation Day,3 have 
called for greater mass electoral deliberation (MED)—deliberation by a large proportion of 
citizens regarding the issues at stake in elections. Yet this call has not been widely embraced by 
democratic theorists.  
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Proposals for greater MED face four key objections: 
1) There is no form of MED that can realize the benefits of citizen deliberation while 
avoiding its dangers. 
 
2) The costs of greater MED are prohibitively high. 
 
3) There are alternative democratic reforms that can realize benefits similar to 
MED’s at lower costs. 
 
4) Calls for greater MED, especially institutionalized forms of MED, are politically 
quixotic. 
 
In this article, I shall respond to these objections by proposing a novel form of MED: 
Citizen Duty. Citizen Duty asks each citizen to participate in one day of carefully-structured 
deliberation with a small, diverse group of fellow citizens prior to major national elections (with 
different citizens deliberating on different days). Citizen Duty deliberations would take place 
outside of participants’ local communities, would employ public school teachers as moderators, 
and would rely on attendance incentives similar to those utilized by jury duty. I shall argue that 
these features would enable Citizen Duty to realize the benefits of MED while avoiding its 
dangers. 
Admittedly, these features also make Citizen Duty particularly vulnerable to objections 
regarding costs and political feasibility. However, appealing to a comparison with jury duty, I 
will argue that Citizen Duty’s benefits outweigh its costs and that its use of legal coercion is 
justified. I will also argue that several alternatives cannot deliver Citizen Duty’s distinctive 
benefits. Finally, I will argue that this type of institutionalized MED is not as politically quixotic 
as it first appears. Citizen Duty therefore merits careful consideration as a serious proposal for 
democratic reform. 
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1. Mass Electoral Deliberation Defined 
 “Deliberation” in everyday usage means careful thought or discussion about some 
decision. However, in this article, I will use “deliberation” as shorthand for “minimally desirable 
interpersonal deliberation.” I will assume that deliberation entails at least minimal levels of 
viewpoint diversity, public-spiritedness, equal respect, and equality of participation.4 
Mass deliberation is deliberation by a large proportion of a polity’s citizenry. In a polity 
larger than a small village, mass deliberation clearly cannot occur in a single forum. It will 
instead have to take place in large number of smaller deliberative forums. 
Mass electoral deliberation is mass deliberation about the issues at stake in some 
upcoming election. Of course, MED already occurs informally to some extent in any election. I 
am interested here in whether MED should be actively encouraged, and, if so, what type and 
how. 
The answers to these questions depend to a considerable extent on electoral context. 
Throughout this article, I will focus on American presidential elections. However, many of the 
arguments advanced here could be utilized, with some adjustments, to justify greater citizen 
deliberation (at least of a certain sort) prior to other elections and even major referenda. 
 
2. The Benefits of Mass Electoral Deliberation: A Review 
 The case for greater mass electoral deliberation rests in large part on MED’s sizeable 
benefits. These benefits have been extensively analyzed by other scholars, and I shall not attempt 
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to add to these analyses here. My aim instead will be to offer a brief synthesis of MED’s key 
benefits.  
In doing so, I will set aside (for the moment) questions regarding how these benefits can 
be realized. Yet my discussion will not be wholly divorced from real-world considerations. I 
recognize that asking citizens to devote a great deal of additional time to deliberation is a 
normative and practical non-starter.5 I will therefore limit my description of MED’s benefits to 
those that can be plausibly realized by one additional day of citizen deliberation per election. 
 
2.1 A More Informed Electorate 
A key benefit of greater MED is the improvement in political outcomes that can be 
realized by combatting citizens’ political ignorance. This ignorance is one of the most well-
documented facts of American political life. For example, when Americans were asked to 
associate policy positions with either Al Gore or George W. Bush shortly before the 2000 
election, a majority of respondents were only able to associate one policy position correctly with 
each candidate (and this is likely due to correct guessing).6 
As Ackerman and Fishkin argue, combatting this political ignorance would lead to better 
political outcomes in two key ways. First, voters who are more informed are more likely to make 
wise electoral decisions.7 Second, elected representatives who can anticipate being held 
accountable by more informed voters may well pursue better policies—policies that reflect an 
informed public opinion rather than the public’s misconceptions.8 
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Admittedly, citizens cannot be reasonably expected to become even moderately informed 
about the many complex issues at stake in a presidential election through one additional day of 
deliberation.9  Yet some increase in political knowledge is plausible. If MED focused on a single 
policy issue, then even several hours of deliberation could plausibly substantially increase 
citizens’ understanding of it.10 Alternatively, if MED focused on the electoral choice more 
generally, even a fairly short period of deliberation could plausibly educate citizens at least about 
what the most important issues are and where the different candidates stand on them.11 Given 
citizens’ abysmally low levels of political knowledge, even such relatively modest improvements 
could plausibly lead to better political outcomes in the ways described above.12 
 
2.2 Increased Recognition of Reasonable Political Disagreement 
MED can also improve political outcomes by increasing citizens’ appreciation for the 
political disagreement that exists among fellow citizens. As John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-
Morse argue in Stealth Democracy, citizens greatly underestimate the extent of disagreement 
regarding which political issues are most important.13 And they often see policy dilemmas as 
problems of efficiently implementing commonsense, widely-agreed-upon solutions rather than as 
the sites of complex empirical and normative controversy that they generally are.14 
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Combatting citizens’ false belief in political consensus would have several benefits. First, 
it would reduce citizens’ unwarranted distrust of representative institutions. As Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse argue, citizens’ belief in political consensus leads many to see representative 
institutions, not as arenas for resolving legitimate political disagreements, but rather as sites of 
dysfunctional bickering at best and corruption by special interests at worst.15 Increasing citizens’ 
appreciation for representative institutions could in turn reduce the unfair electoral disadvantage 
facing “establishment” politicians16 and improve compliance with the laws passed by these 
institutions.17 
Increasing citizens’ appreciation of political disagreement could also foster greater 
respect for policy expertise. Troublingly, many citizens currently believe that individuals with 
little policy experience can in fact do a better job governing than experienced legislators.18 As 
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse argue, this attitude is at least in part the result of citizens’ failure to 
appreciate the complex empirical and normative controversies that underlie many policy 
dilemmas.19 
Finally, increasing citizens’ appreciation for political disagreement could foster greater 
deliberation and compromise among elected representatives. As many political theorists have 
argued, these activities are often crucial to good political outcomes.20 Yet elected representatives 
are less likely to engage in these activities when so many voters view them unfavorably. In one 
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survey, 86% of Americans agreed that elected officials should “stop talking and take action.” 
And 60% agreed that compromise was “the equivalent of selling out on principles rather than a 
needed concession to legitimate opposing interests for the sake of some kind of solution.”21 As 
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse argue, these negative attitudes towards deliberation and compromise 
stem in large part from citizens’ failure to appreciate the extent of political disagreement that 
exists among their fellow citizens.22  
It is not difficult to see how even one additional day of MED could improve citizens’ 
recognition of political disagreement. MED would expose citizens to fellow citizens with 
different views about which policy issues are important and how these issues should be resolved. 
It could thus plausibly realize, at least to some extent, the considerable benefits associated with 
combatting citizens’ false belief in political consensus. 
 
2.3 Greater Civic Virtue 
Another benefit of MED is its capacity to increase civic virtue. As Fishkin argues, 
participating in even one day of deliberation can encourage citizens to consider the public good 
rather than their narrow self-interest.23 Deliberation can also increase citizens’ tolerance by 
exposing them to fellow citizens with different political views, from different religious or ethnic 
groups, and from different walks of life.24 Finally, the greater political knowledge and 
deliberative skills fostered by deliberation can increase citizens’ civic engagement.25  
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Greater civic virtue has three key benefits. First, more public-spirited and tolerant citizens 
may well support more public-spirited and tolerant candidates and policies. Second, an increase 
in the tolerance and public-spiritedness of citizens would improve social cohesion and 
cooperation. Third, greater citizen political engagement would foster a more vibrant democracy. 
 
2.4 A More Legitimate and Respectful Electoral Process 
The final set of MED benefits are non-instrumental—that is, they do not relate to better 
political or social outcomes. These are MED’s capacity to improve the legitimacy and 
respectfulness of elections. Note that these normative values are different from citizens’ 
perceptions of electoral legitimacy and respectfulness. Though these perceptions also have 
important political and social benefits,26 I will focus here on the values themselves.27 
MED can foster electoral respectfulness and legitimacy in four key ways. First, when 
citizens deliberate prior to voting, they express respect for each other as autonomous agents who 
should understand and have some say in the important collectively-binding choices that shape 
their lives.28 Second, by deliberating prior to voting, citizens express respect for others by taking 
care with a decision that has enormous, coercively-binding consequences for others’ lives.29 
Third, receiving justifications (at least of a certain sort) from the relevant decision-makers can 
make collectively-binding decisions more legitimate.30 Finally, due to its capacity to increase 
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political knowledge, MED can increase the likelihood of elections reflecting an informed 
democratic will, thus increasing elections’ democratic legitimacy.31 
Some may doubt that one day of deliberation would make much of a difference. 
However, given that many citizens currently cast their votes—decisions with enormous 
consequences for fellow citizens’ lives—based on little more than top-of-the-head impressions, 
news snippets, and cues,32 even a modest increase in voters’ levels of care and knowledge could 
generate substantial increases in electoral respectfulness and legitimacy. These non-instrumental 
benefits, along with the instrumental benefits discussed above, constitute a strong pro tanto case 
in favor of greater MED. 
 
3. Meeting the Challenges of Citizen Deliberation 
Many opponents of greater mass electoral deliberation do not deny that it has 
considerable benefits in theory. However, they doubt whether MED would realize these lofty 
benefits in practice. Indeed, they argue that greater MED would actually be harmful.33 My aim in 
this section is to rehearse the problems with greater citizen deliberation and to argue that there is 
a form of MED that can avoid them. 
 
3.1 The Challenges of Citizen Deliberation: A Brief Review 
Opponents of greater mass electoral deliberation have several well-grounded concerns. 
First, they question citizens’ willingness to participate in deliberation.34 Even assuming that 
                                                 
31
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32
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MED would be beneficial for society as a whole, the costs of participation (e.g., the lost time) 
must be borne by individuals. Inducing citizens to deliberate therefore requires overcoming the 
same type collective action problem that underlies citizens’ failure to become more politically 
informed.35 
Indeed, inducing citizens to deliberate is more challenging than inducing them to engage 
in other types of political learning. Conflict-averse citizens find the prospect of witnessing 
political arguments to be off-putting.36 And other citizens may be less than eager to sit through 
the often stilted and meandering deliberation of ordinary people.37 Finally, though deliberation 
provides an opportunity for participation, many citizens may be uncomfortable speaking in front 
of others or may be worried about the social consequences of sharing unpopular, uninformed, or 
inarticulate views.38 If deliberation only attracts a small number of participants who are already 
passionately committed to certain views, it is very unlikely to realize the benefits described 
above. 
Even if a large proportion of citizens participate, there are several other reasons for 
doubting the capacity of MED to realize the benefits described above. First, given citizens’ 
ignorance and propensity to focus on the salacious, MED may misinform more than it informs.39 
Second, if the deliberative forums that constitute MED lack diversity, MED may confirm 
citizens’ false belief in political consensus. Third, insufficient diversity could serve to increase 
the participants’ commitment to their group interest at the expense of the public good.40 Fourth, 
MED can bring hidden conflicts to light, thus increasing rather than ameliorating social 
                                                 
35
 For one discussion of this problem, see Ackerman and Fishkin, Deliberation Day, 8. 
36
 Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy, 135. 
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conflict.41 Finally, if deliberation lacks civility or if the arguments made are ignorant, selfish, or 
prejudiced, then deliberation may, if anything, reduce electoral legitimacy and respectfulness.42 
Citizen deliberation has three additional well-known dangers. First, if deliberation lacks 
sufficient viewpoint diversity, it can lead participants to polarize, adopting views that are in the 
majority in their particular deliberative forum due an imbalanced pool of arguments.43 Such 
polarization can further undermine tolerance and social cooperation across political lines. 
Second, increased MED can expose citizens to unfairly harsh punishments for expressing certain 
political views, especially those that are locally unpopular.44 Finally, MED could exacerbate 
political inequalities by favoring the views of the more privileged.45 Thus, while MED may be 
attractive in theory, there are good reasons for doubting its capacity to realize substantial net 
benefits in practice. 
 
3.2 The Problems with Relying on Norm Change 
 Proponents of greater mass electoral deliberation are generally well-aware of MED’s 
dangers. Yet they believe that measures can be taken to avoid them. One camp of MED 
proponents propose addressing the shortcomings of citizen deliberation by changing the social 
norms governing everyday political discussions. Diana Mutz, for example, calls for media 
campaigns, civics education reform, and changes in democratic institutions (e.g., the atmosphere 
                                                 
41
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of national debates) aimed at increasing the value that citizens place on respectful engagement 
with those holding opposing political views.46 Mutz hopes that these norm changes will make 
citizens’ everyday political discussions, especially those across political lines, more frequent and 
constructive.47 
 However, there are several problems with relying on social norm change to address the 
challenges of citizen deliberation. First, as many scholars have recognized, altering social norms 
is no easy task.48 And the norms of political intolerance that Mutz hopes to alter are well-
entrenched and becoming stronger, at least in the United States.49 Moreover, even if these norms 
can be transformed (e.g., through civics education), this will require a great deal of time.50 Yet 
the problems that MED aims to address are pressing. 
In addition, several social norms besides those associated with political intolerance would 
have to change to avoid the dangers described above. For example, norms that make political 
ignorance socially acceptable and norms connecting social status to the deference paid to views 
will also need to be addressed to combat deliberation’s propensity to spread misinformation and 
to exacerbate political inequality. Attempting to substantially alter all of the relevant norms is an 
enormously challenging undertaking. 
 Finally, many of the obstacles to beneficial MED cannot be easily addressed by norm 
change. For example, local American viewpoint homogeneity would continue to hamper 
discussions across political lines, even if social norms were more conducive to such 
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discussions.51 Norm change would also not address the economic inequalities that enable some 
citizens to spend more time than others learning about politics. Thus, while altering social norms 
may well address some of the challenges facing citizen deliberation (and may thus be worth 
pursuing), norm change alone is highly unlikely to induce large percentages of citizens to 
participate in civil, constructive deliberation across political lines given existing levels of 
political ignorance, apathy, local viewpoint homogeneity, conflict aversion, social inequality, 
and political intolerance in the United States. 
 
3.3 Deliberative Polls and the Promise of Institutionalized Deliberation 
However, there is an alternative approach. Rather than attempting to fundamentally 
transform everyday political discussions, society can institute artificial deliberative forums 
carefully designed to overcome the challenges of MED. That is, society can implement 
institutionalized mass electoral deliberation.  
I will argue in the rest of this section that a certain type of institutionalized MED that I 
call Citizen Duty can realize the benefits of citizen deliberation while avoiding its dangers. I 
begin here by defending a relatively modest claim: Society would be able to realize the benefits 
of MED while avoiding its dangers if it could implement (on a national scale) deliberative 
forums with consequences akin to those of Deliberative Polls (i.e., if it could “scale up” 
Deliberative Polls). 
A Deliberative Poll (DP) is a deliberative forum that brings together small groups of 
citizens for a relatively short period (e.g., a weekend) of moderated deliberation, with the aim of 
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revealing to policymakers and to the general public what informed public opinion would be on 
the topics discussed.52 DP participants are chosen to ensure representativeness, enticed with a 
generous honorarium, and sent balanced briefing materials prior to the deliberation. At the 
deliberation itself, participants are tasked, not with resolving political controversies, but rather 
with determining via small-group discussion which questions should be posed to a diverse panel 
of experts. Participants then attend a plenary session in which their questions are posed to these 
experts. This small group/plenary session process repeats several times throughout the DP. At 
the end of the DP, participants are generally given an opportunity to share their views with 
fellow deliberators. 
DPs have been extensively studied, and the available evidence strongly suggests that 
scaled-up DPs would realize the benefits of MED while avoiding its dangers. First, DPs have 
been shown to engender substantial levels of participant learning.53 For example, participating in 
a DP about the economic issues at stake in the 1997 British general election increased 
participants’ percentage of correctly answered questions regarding these issues by 14 percentage 
points (from 47% to 61%). And participants’ ability to identity parties with their policy positions 
increased by 7 percentage points (from 41% to 48%). DP also routinely engender sizeable 
changes in policy attitudes and voting intentions. And these changes have been shown to be 
driven by better information.54 Assuming that more informed voters tend to make better choices, 
and assuming that political outcomes are responsive to voter preferences, scaling up DPs is likely 
to significantly increase the probability of good political outcomes. 
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 For a more thorough description of Deliberative Polls, see Fishkin, When the People Speak, 25–26. 
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 Ibid., 134. 
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Scaling up DPs is also likely to foster civic virtue as well as electoral respectfulness and 
legitimacy. DPs have been shown to increase participants’ tolerance,55 public-spiritedness,56 and 
various forms of political engagement.57 Participants generally rate DP discussions as highly 
respectful.58 And given DPs’ capacity to improve voter knowledge, scaling up DPs would 
ameliorate the problems of electoral legitimacy and respectfulness associated voter ignorance. 
Finally, the diversity of DP participants encourages deliberators to give widely accessible 
reasons for their political positions,59 a factor that many democratic theorists argue is key to 
these justifications’ legitimizing force.60 
A reform that scaled up DPs would also avoid the well-known dangers of citizen 
deliberation. Polarization does not predictably occur at DPs.61 The opinion of participants does 
not predictably move in the direction of the more privileged.62 And since DP deliberations occur 
outside of participants’ local communities, participants face little danger of substantial social 
sanctions for expressing unpopular views. 
The potential of scaled-up DPs to foster citizens’ appreciation for political disagreement 
is admittedly less clear. This DP effect has not been extensively studied, and the scant available 
evidence is, if anything, discouraging. In one DP about proposed political reforms in California, 
participants were asked whether those endorsing positions very different from their own had 
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“good reasons” for their views. Participants’ answer to this question in fact became slightly less 
positive after deliberation.63 
However, this does not provide strong grounds for doubting the capacity of scaled-up 
DPs to increase citizens’ appreciation of political disagreement. First, this result might be an 
artifact of the particular design of the California DP. Only a tiny fraction of the weekend-long 
DP’s time (45 minutes) was devoted to providing participants with an opportunity to share their 
post-deliberative views with fellow participants. And this limited time had to compete with a 
variety of administrative tasks (e.g., filling out final questionnaires and reimbursement forms).64 
Allowing additional time for the sharing of post-deliberative views could well improve citizens’ 
appreciation of outstanding political disagreements. 
Second, in the California DP, participants were not making any collectively-binding 
decision post-deliberation. Participants’ motivation to use their closing statement to appeal to 
those who do not share their views (thus highlighting the remaining political disagreements) was 
likely lower than it would be in the case of deliberation regarding an upcoming presidential 
election. 
Finally (and most importantly), the survey question above fails to capture the politically 
relevant attitude. What is important is that citizens recognize their opponents’ political 
justifications as minimally reasonable (rather than “good”). This is sufficient to increase citizens’ 
appreciation for representative institutions, policy expertise, deliberation, and compromise. For 
example, progressive citizens who learn that conservative citizens have economic-growth-based 
or liberty-based reasons for lowering taxes on the wealthy may not agree that these are “good” 
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reasons for lower taxes. However, they might nevertheless concede that these justifications are 
minimally reasonable and thus worthy of representation, worthy of being listened to, and perhaps 
even worth taking into account to some extent in tax policy. 
More research is needed on this issue. However, given the available evidence and the 
arguments above, there are good reasons for thinking that a reform that scaled up the success of 
DPs would realize the benefits of mass electoral deliberation while avoiding its dangers. 
 
3.4 The Problems with Deliberation Day 
 The idea of scaling up Deliberative Polls is not new. Indeed, this is precisely the aim of 
Ackerman and Fishkin’s Deliberation Day (DDay).65 DDay is a proposed two-day national 
holiday during which all citizens would be invited to engage in one day of electoral deliberation 
in their local communities shortly before presidential elections. Like DPs, DDay groups would 
be constituted by a small number of citizens tasked with choosing questions to pose to a panel of 
experts (which, in the case of DDay, would be constituted by party representatives). And, like 
DP participants, DDay participants would be paid a considerable amount ($150) to attend.66  
However, there are also substantial differences between DDay and DPs—differences that I will 
argue undermine DDay’s capacity to scale up DPs.  
The first is the difference in the participation rates required for success. A 20% 
participation rate for a DP (which is not atypical)67 does not undermine the DP’s aim of revealing 
what informed public opinion would be (as long as the attendees are representative of the general 
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public). On the other hand, a 20% participation rate would severely curtail DDay’s capacity to 
combat voter ignorance, foster appreciation of political disagreement, increase civic virtue, and 
improve electoral legitimacy and respectfulness. Indeed, if only a small percentage of citizens 
deliberate, and if the outcome endorsed by deliberators is different from the outcome endorsed 
by the non-deliberating majority, DDay could well decrease the democratic legitimacy of the 
electoral result (since those on the losing side could argue that their preferred outcome represents 
the true democratic will). 
Admittedly, there are reasons for thinking that DDay participation rates will be higher 
than DPs’. The DDay honorarium is somewhat higher than the typical day-long DP’s, the travel 
burden is less onerous, the sense of civic duty to attend DDay would likely be stronger, and the 
promise of catching up with friends and neighbors at the local deliberation may serve as 
substantial inducements to attend.68  
 Yet there are also reasons for thinking that DDay participation rates will be lower than 
DPs’. DP participants do not have to worry about unwelcome interactions with acquaintances 
and neighbors, are promised media attention, and often receive individualized assistance from 
DP organizers in addressing their attendance difficulties. Moreover, while DPs generally take 
place in high-quality venues (e.g., universities, hotels, conference centers), DDay’s attempt to 
accommodate tens of millions of deliberators over two days requires using deliberation spaces 
that are far less ideal (e.g., elementary schools with rented chairs or places of worship).69 
DDay’s two-day timeframe also creates special attendance obstacles for certain groups of 
citizens. Consider, for example, those responsible for childcare. While DP participants have a 
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variety of childcare options, it is unclear who will take care of society’s children during a two-
day holiday in which schools are closed and a substantial proportion of adults are either 
deliberating or working. It is also unclear where childcare will take place if schools, community 
centers, and places of worship are used for deliberation. After all, there are nowhere near enough 
experienced teenage babysitters to provide home supervision to a substantial fraction of society’s 
children on a particular day. DDay’s two-day format raises similar problems for those providing 
informal eldercare and makes attendance very difficult for those employed in essential services. 
Thus, DDay participation rates may well be even lower than the fairly low participation rates 
achieve by DPs.70  
Some of these participation problems could admittedly be ameliorated by increasing the 
DDay honorarium. However, the exclusive reliance on high payments to induce attendance is 
problematic. First, high attendance payments may “crowd out” duty-based attendance 
motivations.71 Second, unless the payment was very high indeed, it would be unlikely to 
motivate high-income individuals with attendance difficulties to attend. Finally, while a 
sufficiently high payment would no doubt achieve a high participation rate, it would very 
substantially increase DDay’s economic costs as well as the coercion imposed on taxpayers.72 
Thus, DDay’s participation challenges cannot be attractively solved by a higher honorarium. 
Another problematic difference between DDay and DPs is the absence of moderators. 
Ackerman and Fishkin reject the use of moderators primarily due to concerns about the capture 
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of the moderator core by political parties.73 Yet moderators play several important roles in DPs. 
They help keep the deliberation civil, clarify and synthesize participants’ points, keep 
participants on task, and actively encourage equality of participation.74  
Ackerman and Fishkin propose replacing moderators with a citizen foreman charged with 
enforcing 90-second speaking turns.75 However, this is a recipe for stilted deliberation. And since 
the rhetorical skill needed to make a coherent point in 90 seconds is unequally distributed, and 
since more reticent participants (who are often more socially disadvantaged) may need active 
participation encouragement, simply guaranteeing formal equality of speaking opportunity is 
unlikely to achieve DP-levels of equality of participation and influence. 
Yet another problematic difference between DDay deliberations and DPs is DDay’s lack 
of focus. Ackerman and Fishkin allow each presidential candidate to raise two issues for DDay 
deliberation. They also explicitly allow opportunities for citizens to raise a variety of other issues 
for discussion.76 The resulting number of topics is far greater than those discussed in DPs relative 
to the time allotted. Yet without focused discussion of at least several hours on a single policy 
issue, it is unclear whether anything like the typical DP levels of learning will occur.  
However, the most problematic difference between DDay and DPs is the local character 
of DDay deliberations. Local deliberations would considerably undermine viewpoint diversity. 
Note that, in some communities, rates of support for particular presidential candidates are above 
80%.77 And participants who are in the political minority locally may decide not to attend or to 
remain silent due to the fear of social sanctions. Yet without viewpoint diversity in DDay’s 
                                                 
73
 Ackerman and Fishkin, Deliberation Day, 65–66. 
74
 Fishkin, When the People Speak, 132. 
75
 Ackerman and Fishkin, Deliberation Day, 27. 
76
 Ibid., 25–27. 
77
 Thomas Frohlich and Alexander Kent, "The Most Democratic County in Every State," Huffington Post, accessed 
June 5, 2019, http://247wallst.com/special-report/2016/10/08/the-most-democratic-county-in-every-
state/2/?utm_source=huffingtonpost.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=pubexchange_article. 
21 
 
constitutive deliberative forums, many of the benefits of scaled up DPs are unlikely to be 
realized. And the problem of polarization (which DPs are able to avoid) is likely to arise. 
Indeed, there is evidence to support this final concern. In “What Happened on 
Deliberation Day?,” Hastie, Schkade, and Sunstein conducted an experiment in which citizens 
deliberated in Boulder, Colorado (a progressive community) and in Silver Springs, Colorado (a 
conservative community) about global warming, affirmative action, and same-sex marriage. The 
result was substantial viewpoint polarization, with deliberators’ views in Boulder becoming more 
progressive and deliberators’ views in Silver Springs becoming more conservative.78 This 
evidence further undermines Ackerman and Fishkin’s claim that DDay would scale up the 
success of DPs. 
 
3.5 The Promise of Citizen Duty 
 However, the problems with DDay need not lead us to abandon the idea of scaling up 
Deliberative Polls. I will argue here that there is an alternative form of institutionalized MED 
that can avoid DDay’s shortcomings: Citizen Duty.  
The Citizen Duty process would begin approximately one year prior to presidential 
elections with the convening of a Citizen Assembly—a randomly chosen group of 100 citizens 
who would be invited to Washington DC for several weekends (with selection methods and 
participation incentives similar to those used in DPs). This Assembly’s most important task 
would be to choose one policy issue to be discussed during the morning of Citizen Duty 
deliberations. The Assembly would consider polls of which issues citizens view as most 
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important, listen to the parties’ views, and also hear from experts regarding the issue 
characteristics most conducive to productive deliberation. After choosing the issue, the 
Assembly would then be tasked with approving the work of a bipartisan commission charged 
with constructing balanced briefing materials on this issue (similar to the materials used for 
DPs).  
Shortly after the Citizen Assembly makes its issue selection, all citizens would be invited 
to submit preferences for a deliberation date from among the weekdays of their state’s public 
school summer holiday. These preferences, along with demographic data and party registration 
information, would then be used to algorithmically assign citizens to politically diverse twelve-
person deliberating groups at a particular date and location. To foster viewpoint diversity, the 
assigned locations will be well outside of the citizens’ local community. However, to limit the 
demands on participants, the location will be within the distance limit from the citizen’s home 
used for federal jury duty (e.g., 80 miles in Northern California).79 School busses (many of 
which are unused over the summer) would be utilized to facilitate transportation. 
In the early spring, citizens would receive their assigned Citizen Duty date and location. 
Attendance would be legally required (with penalties for non-attendance similar to those used for 
jury duty).80 However, the compensation for attendance would be more generous than jury duty 
compensation. All employers above a certain size would be legally required to pay their 
employees’ salaries for the day. And any participant who does not receive at least $150 of 
compensation from an employer would be entitled to refundable tax credit sufficient to ensure 
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that she receives at least $150 (or whatever the median wage is at the time) in participation 
compensation. 
Citizen Duty deliberations would begin with a pre-recorded candidate debate about the 
policy issue chosen by the Citizen Assembly (with questions chosen by the Assembly). As in the 
case of DDay, participants would then engage in moderated small-group deliberations regarding 
what further questions to pose to local party representatives about this issue. Next, participants 
would gather for a late-morning plenary session during which the party representatives would 
answer the small groups’ questions. Citizens would then be provided with boxed lunches, which 
they would be encouraged to eat with their small deliberating group. 
The afternoon of Citizen Duty would be devoted to the electoral choice more generally. It 
would begin with a second pre-recorded candidate debate about this choice (with topics and 
questions chosen by the Citizen Assembly). This debate would be followed by small-group 
deliberation on which questions to pose to the party representatives regarding the issues 
discussed in the afternoon’s debate (or any other election-related issue that citizens feel is 
important). An afternoon plenary session would follow, during which the local party 
representatives would once again answer the small groups’ questions. The day would conclude 
with an hour in which citizens would have an opportunity to share their post-deliberative views 
regarding the morning’s policy issue and the electoral choice more generally with their fellow 
deliberators (with no more than five minutes allocated per person). 
Citizen Duty’s design addresses the shortcomings of Deliberation Day in several ways. 
First, Citizen Duty’s participation incentives make high attendance far more likely. Given the use 
of legal coercion, a good lower-bound estimate of the Citizen Duty participation rate is the 
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approximately 50% rate of compliance achieved by jury duty in the United States.81 However, 
given Citizen Duty’s more substantial compensation and the fact that only one day of 
deliberation is required at a time, participation rates for Citizen Duty may well be substantially 
higher. A good upper-bound estimate is the rate of compliance with the legal requirement to vote 
in Australia (which lies above 90%).82 
Spreading MED across the summer school holiday solves several additional problems. 
First, Citizen Duty deliberations can take place exclusively in fairly high-quality venues—
unused high school and middle school classrooms and auditoriums.83 Second, spreading out 
MED dramatically reduces the participation obstacles for those responsible for childcare, 
eldercare, and essential services. 
Citizen Duty’s summer timeframe also allows for an attractive solution to the problem of 
moderators. Public school teachers can be hired and trained for this role.84 Many teachers seek 
summer employment, and many already have significant skills in discussion facilitation. 
Moreover, public school teachers are already trusted (at least by many) to stay politically neutral 
in their classrooms. Finally (and most importantly), it seems highly unlikely that anyone would 
become a public school teacher in order to become a Citizen Duty moderator, thus addressing 
Ackerman and Fishkin’s worry about moderators’ political capture.85 
Citizen Duty addresses DDay’s problematic lack of focus by devoting the morning of 
deliberation to the single policy issue (chosen by the Citizen Assembly). This admittedly 
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sacrifices some breadth of learning. However, it is unrealistic to expect deep learning on a broad 
range of policy issues from a single day of deliberation in any case. The morning’s focus on a 
single issue would encourage learning on this issue prior to deliberation and would enable 
citizens to better recognize this issue’s moral and empirical complexity (and, after several 
Citizen Duty experiences, the moral and empirical complexity of policy issues more generally). 
The afternoon’s deliberation about the electoral choice would still provide citizens with 
sufficient opportunity to learn something about other major issues (e.g., what they are and where 
the parties stand on them), would enable citizens to recognize the disagreements among fellow 
citizens regarding which issues are most important, and would provide an opportunity for 
citizens to raise issues not discussed during the candidate debates. 
Finally, Citizen Duty’s non-local character solves two key problems facing DDay. First, 
it protects citizens from being subjected to social sanctions for expressing locally-unpopular 
views. Second, it enables Citizen Duty to achieve far greater viewpoint diversity within its 
constitutive small deliberating groups. Indeed, a cursory examination of county-level presidential 
election data suggests that a travel requirement in the neighborhood of 80 miles would be 
sufficient to achieve a great deal of viewpoint diversity, especially since conservatives and 
progressives in particularly homogeneous areas of the country can be asked to meet at an 
intermediate location.86  
In the case of citizens in highly homogenous parts the country, those serving overseas, 
and those with severe mobility difficulties, Citizen Duty deliberations could be conducted 
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online.87 Though online deliberation is not as effective as face-to-face deliberation (and should 
therefore not be used for Citizen Duty in general), it has been shown to achieve at least some of 
the benefits of Deliberative Polls.88  
In sum, Citizen Duty’s legally-required attendance, use of moderators, focus of the 
morning’s deliberation on a single issue, and travel requirements make it far more likely than 
DDay to nationally scale up DPs’ success. There are thus good reasons for thinking that Citizen 
Duty would realize the benefits of citizen deliberation while avoiding its dangers. 
 
4. Justifying Citizen Duty’s Costs 
 Admittedly, the measures Citizen Duty employs to address the challenges of mass 
electoral deliberation make it particularly vulnerable to cost-based objections. The high 
economic costs of Citizen Duty include the costs of participants’ time, administrative and 
logistical expenses, participant travel, moderators’ training and salaries, the expenses of the 
Citizen Assembly, and the economic costs associated with raising the necessary tax revenue. 
Although I cannot calculate these costs in detail here, a back of the envelope calculation suggests 
that they could run as high as $44 billion (given a very optimistic assumption of 180 million 
Citizen Duty participants).89 Yet, as Ian Shapiro argues, the benefits of one day of citizen 
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deliberation hardly seem worth billions of dollars.90  Moreover, Citizen Duty legally requires 
attendance. This constitutes a substantial infringement on citizens’ liberty—a weighty moral cost 
that also requires justification. 
In this section, I will offer two justifications for Citizen Duty’s costs. First, I will offer a 
consequentialist argument aimed at establishing that Citizen Duty’s benefits are greater than its 
costs. Second, I will suggest that Citizen Duty has a set of features relating to certain rights and 
duties that are jointly sufficient to justify its use of coercion. 
 
4.1 A Consequentialist Defense of Citizen Duty’s Costs 
At first glance, it is unclear how one could evaluate whether Citizen Duty’s benefits are 
greater than its costs. How should we compare the benefits of greater legitimacy to travel costs 
or the protection of rights to the cost of coercion? Trying to find a dollar equivalent for these 
benefits and costs (as is done in traditional cost-benefit analysis) would be highly complex, 
speculative, and morally controversial.91 
Fortunately, there is a way to avoid having to find a common metric for these diverse 
costs and benefits—a comparison with jury duty. Jury duty has benefits and costs very similar to 
Citizen Duty’s. Thus, if jury duty’s benefits are greater than its costs (as I will assume),92 and if 
the benefits of Citizen Duty are greater than the benefits of jury duty (as I will argue), then 
Citizen Duty’s benefits are greater than its costs. 
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 This argument first requires determining the span of jury duty whose costs are equivalent 
to Citizen Duty’s. Michael Singer estimates the lower bound of jury duty’s yearly costs at 9 
million legally-required citizen-days and a little over $2 billion.93 Thus, given the estimates 
above, Citizen Duty for one presidential election would have economic and liberty costs on par 
with 20 years of jury duty. The question, then, is this: Are the expected benefits of Citizen Duty 
for one presidential election greater than the benefits of 20 years of jury duty? I will argue that 
they are. 
 
4.1.1 The Benefits of Jury Duty 
Defenders of jury duty justify its high costs by appealing to several key benefits. These 
benefits are admittedly controversial, and settling the relevant debates is beyond the scope of this 
article. However, since my aim is to argue that Citizen Duty’s benefits are greater than jury 
duty’s, I will adopt an optimistic view of jury duty’s benefits in order to make my argument 
more robust. 
 The first benefit of jury duty is the greater protection of rights, primarily via more 
accurate trial judgments.94 There are approximately 150,000 jury trials per year in the United 
States or 3 million trials over the course of 20 years.95 Scholars have estimated that there is a 
difference between the decision the jury reaches and the decision the judge would have reached 
in an estimated 1/5th of trials.96 Thus, over the course of 20 years, roughly 600,000 trial outcomes 
are affected by the use of juries.  
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To estimate the magnitude of the associated benefits, we would need to know how often 
the jury gets it right when the judge and jury disagree, what is at stake in the affected trials, and 
how the justice of the plea-bargaining and civil settlement processes would be affected if juries 
were no longer used. This information is very difficult to obtain. However, we might 
optimistically guess that 20 years of jury duty safeguards the rights of something on the order of 
one million individuals, ranging from those facing unjust seizure of property to those facing 
unjust incarceration and, in rare cases, even unjust execution. 
Another way jury duty protects rights is by encouraging changes in unjust laws through a 
phenomenon known as jury nullification. In some cases (e.g., laws with implausibly harsh 
penalties), juries have simply refused to convict even patently guilty defendants. This has led 
(albeit infrequently) to legal reform that has safeguarded the rights of large numbers of 
individuals.97  
A second key benefit of jury duty is the economic savings associated with avoiding 
unjust incarceration. The average time served in prison in the United States in 2009 was 2.9 
years and the average yearly cost for imprisoning a person was $31,116.98 Thus, if jury duty over 
20 years prevents something on the order of 200,000 people from being unjustly imprisoned,99 
the savings are on the order of $18 billion.100 
A third set of jury duty benefits relate to the civics education it provides participants. As 
several thinkers have argued, jury service leads jurors to enlarge their horizons beyond their 
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narrow self-interest to the broader common good.101 In addition, jury duty helps increase 
tolerance by exposing citizens to others from different walks of life.102 
Finally, jury duty has important non-instrumental benefits. The greater propensity of 
juries to reach correct decisions increases the trial’s legitimacy.103 And the fact that society asks 
a significant number of ordinary citizens to sit through a trial to improve the accuracy of its 
outcome expresses respect for those whose property, freedom, and even life may be on the line. 
 
4.1.2 Citizen Duty’s Greater Benefits 
Even on this optimistic account of jury duty’s benefits, Citizen Duty’s benefits are greater 
still. First, Citizen Duty, even for one presidential election, arguably offers greater expected 
protection for rights. National policy in areas such as healthcare, social security, foreign policy, 
and the environment each affect the rights of tens of millions of citizens (and even hundreds of 
millions when we consider the effects of policies over several generations), not to mention 
millions of foreigners. In some cases, the relevant rights are a matter of life and death. Since the 
choice of president affects a large number of different policy areas, even conservative estimates 
of Citizen Duty’s capacity to improve political outcomes implies that it provides substantially 
greater protection for citizens’ rights compared with 20 years of jury duty. 
Citizen Duty’s expected economic benefits are also likely to be greater than the economic 
benefits of better trials. Bad policies are expensive. An unwise war, for example, not only 
jeopardizes lives. It also has economic costs that can run in the trillions of dollars.104 Similarly, 
unwisely delaying a necessary war can make the underlying problem much more difficult and 
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costly to address. Unwise decisions in other national policy areas have costs that can easily run 
in the hundreds of billions of dollars. Thus, even a conservative estimate of Citizen Duty’s 
capacity to improve political outcomes implies that its expected economic benefits are greater 
than those of jury duty. Indeed, if Citizen Duty prevents one unwise war, this alone would cover 
the economic costs of dozens of Citizen Duty deliberations. 
Citizen Duty also offers participants a better civics education than jury duty does. Note 
first that, while many of the citizen-days required by jury duty involve waiting in the jury 
pool,105 all citizen-days required by Citizen Duty involve potentially edifying deliberation. 
Moreover, while jury deliberations often concern narrow questions of fact about a specific 
incident, Citizen Duty deliberations concern policy issues and are therefore much more 
conducive to broadening citizens’ political horizons. And since Citizen Duty explicitly aims at 
political diversity among participants, it has greater potential for exposing citizens to others with 
different views and backgrounds. 
Finally, Citizen Duty’s non-instrumental benefits are arguably greater than jury duty’s. 
First, since more is at stake for citizens’ rights in a presidential election than in even 20 years of 
jury trials, the moral importance of ensuring that the decision is made in a respectful and 
legitimate way is greater. Second, while juries do not explain their decisions, Citizen Duty 
provides an opportunity for citizens to be given justifications for coercively-binding outcomes 
with which they disagree. Finally (and most importantly), the alternative to jury duty (a trial by 
judge) is much better than the alternative to Citizen Duty in terms of respectfulness and 
legitimacy. While a judge may not be as unbiased or as good in ascertaining facts as juries are, 
judges are highly knowledgeable and can generally be counted on to give cases careful 
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consideration. The alternative to Citizen Duty, on the other hand, is large numbers of citizens 
making their electoral choice with shockingly low levels of care and minimal knowledge—a 
state of affairs that severely undermines electoral legitimacy and respectfulness.  
Thus, there is a strong case for viewing the benefits of Citizen Duty for one presidential 
election as greater than those of even 20 years of jury duty. If the benefits of 20 years of jury 
duty are greater than the roughly $40 billion and 180 million citizen-days it requires, then Citizen 
Duty’s benefits are greater than these costs as well. 
 
4.2 A Liberal Justification for Citizen Duty’s Coercion 
The argument above may convince liberal political philosophers that Citizen Duty’s 
economic costs can be justified. However, liberal philosophers have long argued that coercion 
cannot be justified by simply appealing to large collective benefits. It instead requires careful 
consideration of rights and duties.106  My aim here is to argue that citizens’ rights and duties 
justify Citizen Duty’s coercion.  
To make this argument, I will once again appeal to a comparison with jury duty. I will 
take the permissibility of jury duty’s coercion as given.107 I will then propose several jury duty 
features that are jointly sufficient to justify its use of coercion. Finally, I will argue that Citizen 
Duty has these features as well. 
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4.2.1 The Justification for Jury Duty Coercion 
There are five features of jury duty that, taken together, plausibly justify its use of 
coercion. First (and most importantly), jury duty protects weighty rights. Litigants face the threat 
of losing their property, freedom, and, in some cases, even lives. Moreover, what is at stake for 
litigants is not a positive right to assistance (which some liberals discount), but rather negative 
rights against being subjected to unjust state power.  
Second, the litigants are subject to the legal authority of the jurors’ nation-state. This 
means that the litigants and jurors are often part of the same scheme of social cooperation, which 
arguably grounds a special responsibility on the part of jurors to safeguard the litigants’ rights.108 
It also means that the jurors are citizens of the state that is subjecting the litigants to coercive 
power. This also arguably gives jurors a special duty to ensure that the coercive power used in 
their name is exercised justly. 
Third, the sacrifice jury duty demands of each coerced individual is not unreasonably 
high. If jury duty required 10,000 individuals to serve as jurors for life, I take it that jury duty 
would be impermissible. However, in the current system, most jurors only serve for a few days, 
receive some financial compensation for their service, enjoy legal protection from job loss, and 
are offered exemptions from jury service in the case of certain hardships.109 
Fourth, jury duty’s expected benefits are broadly distributed among those who are 
coerced. Any juror can potentially find herself falsely accused of wrongdoing or facing a 
patently unjust law and thus reliant on the protections offered by a jury of her peers. This implies 
that the juror and litigants often stand in relations of reciprocity, since they can each be asked to 
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come to each other’s aid. These relations of reciprocity arguably strengthen individuals’ duties to 
contribute to cooperative enterprises.110 The broad distribution of jury duty’s expected benefits 
also reduces the net expected costs that jury duty imposes on any particular individual. Indeed, 
for many individuals, the institution of jury duty can be seen as providing net benefits from an ex 
ante perspective (i.e., before one knows whether she will be a litigant or whether she will have to 
serve as a juror). For these individuals, jury duty can be seen, not as a coercively-imposed 
sacrifice for the sake of others, but rather as a coerced solution to a free-rider problem similar to 
the one utilized for many other types of public goods (e.g., the taxation required to pay for 
national defense). 
Fifth, non-coercive alternatives to jury duty’s coercion cannot attractively achieve similar 
benefits.111 If litigants’ rights could be shown to be better protected by professional judges or if a 
purely voluntary system of jury service would work just as well as coerced jury duty, I take it 
that jury duty’s use of coercion would be unjustified. The coercion is only warranted because 
there is no attractive non-coercive alternative way of delivering jury duty’s key benefits (e.g., 
increased protection for litigants’ rights). 
I do not pretend that this brief discussion has established that these five features are the 
precise ones that justify jury duty’s coercion. The justifiability of coercion is, after all, an 
enormously complex topic. However, my justification for Citizen Duty’s coercion does not rest 
on the claim that these are the precise features that justify jury duty’s coercion. Rather, it rests on 
the claim that, whatever the features that justify jury duty’s coercion are, they are also shared by 
Citizen Duty. Thus, though my focus will be on the five features highlighted above, the more 
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fundamental claim that I shall defend is that jury duty and Citizen Duty are broadly similar in 
terms of the duties of participants and the rights they help protect. 
 
4.2.2 The Justification for Citizen Duty Coercion 
The similarity of Citizen Duty to jury duty in terms of the first four features highlighted 
above is not difficult to see. Just as individuals’ rights can be threatened by an unjust trial, so, 
too, individuals’ rights can be threatened by the unjust policies of an unwisely elected president. 
And just as American jurors are asked to safeguard the rights of fellow Americans, so, too, the 
rights that Citizen Duty aims to protect are those of the participants’ compatriots. In addition, 
any Citizen Duty participant can potentially find herself facing an unjust proposed policy and 
reliant on the protections offered by fellow citizens’ careful consideration of the electoral choice. 
Moreover, the sacrifices Citizen Duty imposes on citizens—one working day of deliberation 
every four years—are circumscribed. 
The lack of an attractive alternative to Citizen Duty’s coercion is admittedly more 
difficult to establish because there are so many alternatives to consider. Above, I highlighted the 
problems with relying exclusively non-institutionalized MED (with attempted norm change) or 
on institutionalized MED that relies on monetary payments as the main deliberation participation 
incentive. However, there are also non-coercive proposed reforms that aim at many of same 
benefits as Citizen Duty without relying on MED at all. I will consider these alternatives in the 
next section and will argue that they cannot realize anything approximating Citizen Duty’s 
benefits, either. If so, then Citizen Duty arguably has all five features that I suggested above help 
justify jury duty’s coercion. 
36 
 
In fact, the case for Citizen Duty’s coercion is even stronger than the case for jury duty’s 
coercion in several ways. First, as I argued above, Citizen Duty may well offer an even greater 
protection for rights than jury duty does. Second, the sacrifice that Citizen Duty asks of each 
individual is less onerous than what jury duty can sometimes demand. While particular jurors 
can sometimes be required to serve on juries for months, no person will be asked to deliberate for 
more than approximately 20 days over her lifetime. And Citizen Duty service is also more spread 
out and offers better remuneration compared with jury duty. Finally, the relevant coercive power 
that Citizen Duty aims to tame is the power of the citizens themselves (qua voters). Citizens’ 
responsibility to ensure that this coercive power is used justly is therefore arguably even stronger 
than jurors’. Thus, if jury duty’s coercion is justified there is a strong case for viewing Citizen 
Duty’s coercion as justified as well. 
 
5. The Inadequacy of Alternatives to Mass Deliberation 
Importantly, both the consequentialist justification for Citizen Duty’s costs and the liberal 
justification for its coercion rest on the claim that less costly reforms cannot realize Citizen 
Duty’s benefits. Yet MED’s critics have argued that there are in fact several alternative reforms 
that, in Arthur Lupia’s words, may well “outperform [institutionalized mass electoral 
deliberation] or have an effect so similar that they call into question the … bang for the bucks 
and return on the [time] it requires.”112 If Lupia is right, then the case for Citizen Duty collapses, 
and these alternative democratic reforms should be pursued instead. 
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In this section, I shall consider three prominent alternatives to Citizen Duty: voter 
education initiatives, publicized mini-public deliberations, and improved civics education. I shall 
argue that none of these alternative reforms is capable of delivering anything approximating 
Citizen Duty’s benefits. 
 
5.1 Voter Education Initiatives 
One alternative to institutionalized MED suggested by Lupia is a voter education 
initiative (e.g., encouraging citizens to visit a well-designed political website).113 Such initiatives 
could admittedly combat citizens’ political ignorance, increase the thoughtfulness of their 
electoral decisions, and foster greater recognition of political disagreement—all at a fraction of 
Citizen Duty’s costs. 
However, voter education initiatives are unlikely to realize Citizen Duty’s benefits for 
several reasons. The first is the problem of motivating citizens to engage with the educational 
materials. Simple encouragement is unlikely to be sufficient to induce citizens to bear the 
substantial time costs of becoming more informed. And, while citizens could be paid or coerced 
into engaging with educational materials or even barred from voting unless they become 
sufficiently informed,114 such solutions have a variety of obvious costs that would substantially 
reduce the advantages of educational initiatives over Citizen Duty. 
Second, even if citizens could be induced to engage with educational materials, the 
learning engendered is unlikely to be as balanced as the learning that occurs at Citizen Duty. As 
Fishkin points out, when DP participants are tested after receiving DP briefing materials but 
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before deliberating, those who engage with the briefing materials tend to learn mainly those facts 
and arguments that support their pre-existing views. Face-to-face deliberation seems to have a 
distinctive capacity for fostering balanced learning about political controversies.115 
 Third, educational initiatives are far less likely than Citizen Duty to increase citizens’ 
appreciation of the political disagreement that exists among fellow citizens. Citizen Duty offers 
citizens an opportunity to hear the views of ordinary fellow citizens in a context in which 
interlocutors’ facial and body language can provide distinctive evidence of sincerity.116 By 
contrast, the opposing views presented in educational materials can all too easily be dismissed as 
those of out-of-touch elites, experts corrupted by special interests, or committed ideologues.  
 Finally, education initiatives cannot realize the many other benefits unique to 
deliberation. Such initiatives do not physically bring together citizens from different walks of life 
and thus do not have the same potential for increasing tolerance. They also do not provide 
citizens with an opportunity to be heard by fellow citizens. And, while educational initiatives can 
provide citizens with justifications for unwelcome electoral outcomes, they cannot provide 
citizens with assurances that these justifications (as opposed to various forms of prejudice or 
ignorance) are in fact motivating voters on the opposing side. Thus, educational initiatives are 
unlikely to realize anything approximating Citizen Duty’s benefits. 
 
5.2 Publicized Mini-Public Deliberations 
A second alternative to MED advocated by John Gastil (among others) is publicizing the 
deliberations of small, representative groups of citizens (mini-publics).117 This idea has the 
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potential to avoid some of the problems with other types of education initiatives. Citizens who 
follow the mini-publics’ deliberations (e.g., by watching clips of key arguments online) would 
learn about the views of ordinary fellow citizens. And even those who do not follow the mini-
publics’ deliberations may nevertheless be substantially swayed by the mini-publics’ conclusions 
in their voting behavior.118 If so, then this proposal could achieve many of Citizen Duty’s 
benefits without coercion and without the massive expense of engaging tens of millions of 
citizens in deliberation. 
 However, this proposal also has several shortcomings. First, as in the case of other voter 
education initiatives, it is unclear how citizens can be motivated to pay attention to the mini-
publics’ proceedings. Indeed, following the unpolished, often meandering deliberation of 
ordinary citizens is likely to be even less appealing to many citizens than engaging with a well-
designed political website. 
Gastil’s more modest hope that mere knowledge of the mini-publics’ conclusions could 
reliably influence voting behavior also seems overly optimistic. First, it is unclear why citizens 
looking for voting cues should look to the mini-publics’ conclusions. Why not look instead to 
opinion leaders from their own group? After all, these opinion leaders are likely to better 
represent citizens’ values and interests than the majority of a representative group of fellow 
citizens. Second, citizens may not necessarily trust the mini-publics. Such trust requires 
confidence in the integrity of the mini-public’s design. It also requires a basic understanding of 
the mini-public’s recommendation (to evaluate whether it is reasonable). Yet, just as it is difficult 
to motivate citizens to pay attention to the mini-public’s proceedings, so, too, it is doubtful that 
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citizens will voluntarily gather sufficient information about the mini-public to trust its 
conclusions. 
Indeed, evidence from real-world experiments with mini-publics supports many of these 
doubts. In one set of such experiments, several Canadian provinces asked mini-publics to 
determine which alternative to the existing first-past-the-post voting system (if any) should be 
adopted. The mini-publics’ recommendations were then publicized and put to a referendum.119 
The results of this experiment are not encouraging for mini-publics’ proponents.  First, 
despite fairly substantial media coverage, about a week before the vote in British Columbia 
(BC), 66% of citizens polled admitted to knowing “little or nothing” about the proposed single 
transferable voting system endorsed by the mini-public.120 In Ontario, 81% admitted to knowing 
little or nothing about the Mixed Member Proportional system endorsed by that province’s mini-
public.121 The vast majority of voters did not even take the time to become minimally informed 
about the basics of the voting system that the mini-publics endorsed, let alone the details of the 
mini-public’s deliberation. 
The Canadian experience also casts doubt on the claim that citizens can be reliably 
swayed by mini-publics’ recommendations. Admittedly, over 57% of voters in BC voted for the 
single transferable vote proposal endorsed by the BC mini-public (just short of the threshold 
required to pass the reform).122 However, proposals for voting reform in Ontario, Prince 
Edward’s Island, and the second attempt at voting reform in BC—all endorsed by mini-publics—
were all rejected by more than 60 percent of the electorate.123 Thus, conducting and publicizing 
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mini-public deliberations does not seem to provide a compelling substitute for including citizens 
as active participants in the right kind of mass deliberation. 
 
5.3 Reforming Civics Education 
The final alternative to Citizen Duty that I shall consider here is reforming civics 
education. As Hibbing and Theiss-Morse argue, reformed civics education could increase 
students’ political knowledge and give them the skills and desire to deliberate and remain 
informed throughout their lives. Civics education could also be used to emphasize the existence 
of political disagreement among fellow citizens.124 And while civics education reform is 
certainly not costless, its economic costs are far lower than Citizen Duty’s. 
However, reforming civics education cannot realize Citizen Duty’s benefits, either. First, 
the task of achieving the benefits of MED via civics education faces many of the same 
difficulties facing adult education initiatives. Simply presenting alternative political views to 
students may lead them to focus only on arguments consistent with their pre-existing views or 
may leave them skeptical regarding whether fellow citizens really hold the views presented by 
their teacher. Relying on classroom deliberation would avoid these problems. But such 
deliberation would exclude the views of older citizens and those from different communities.125 
Second, the capacity of civics education to engender widespread, constructive political 
discussions across political lines among adults is doubtful. Many of the problems are similar to 
those I highlighted when considering Mutz’s proposal for norm change. Addressing political 
intolerance and the acceptability of political ignorance via civics education is difficult. And other 
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important obstacles (e.g., local political homogeneity) cannot be addressed by civics education, 
at least not in any substantial way. 
Yet without large increases in constructive deliberation across political lines among non-
students, deliberation among students would have only circumscribed benefits. Deliberation 
limited largely to students would not provide citizens with an opportunity to learn about 
contemporary political issues nor with an opportunity to be heard by other citizens regarding the 
issues at stake in current elections. Indeed, even the appreciation of political disagreement 
engendered by student deliberation may not be long-lasting. Citizens might affirm that there was 
substantial disagreement regarding the suitability of candidate A vs. B or regarding how issue C 
should be resolved among ordinary citizens when they were students 20 years ago. But without 
engaging in constructive deliberation across political lines again, they may well come to believe 
that no reasonable person could support candidate X over Y or policy Z today. 
Finally, even if civics education is entirely successful, its benefits will take many years to 
materialize. Those who undergo this education will not constitute even a bare majority of 
American voters for around a quarter of a century. Yet the problems that Citizen Duty aims to 
address are pressing. Thus, civics education reform also does not offer a compelling substitute 
for Citizen Duty. 
In sum, it is tempting to think that Citizen Duty’s benefits can be realized through less 
costly or radical reforms. However, the alternatives proposed by MED’s opponents cannot 
increase citizens’ political knowledge, improve appreciation of political disagreement, foster 
civic virtue, and increase the legitimacy and respectfulness of elections in the same way as 
asking a majority of citizens to engage in carefully designed, moderated deliberation across 
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political lines prior to major elections. Thus, while these alternatives (e.g., civics education 
reform) may well be worth pursuing alongside Citizen Duty, they are no substitute for it. 
 
6. The Political Feasibility Objection 
 Even if all of the arguments advanced thus far are compelling, some readers may 
nevertheless dismiss Citizen Duty as politically quixotic. As Simone Chambers writes in 
response to Deliberation Day, “Although I applaud the ‘utopian realism’ of Ackerman and 
Fishkin’s Deliberation Day …, I do not suppose that this will happen in the near future.”126  
Although Chambers does not give reasons for her skepticism, the obstacles to 
implementing a reform like Deliberation Day or Citizen Duty are not difficult to see.  First, 
political elites may be seen as unlikely to support such a radical, costly, and potentially 
destabilizing political reform. Second, citizens may be seen as unlikely to support an expensive 
political reform that requires them to engage in an activity that many of them find distasteful.127 
If Citizen Duty is utopian, then both practically-minded political philosophers and democratic 
reformers would be well-advised to turn their attention elsewhere.  
 However, Citizen Duty is substantially less utopian than it initially appears. First, 
political elites may now be more open to proposals that threaten the political status quo than they 
were in the past. A variety of political outcomes, from the election of Jeremy Corbyn to head the 
Labour Party in the UK to the election of Donald Trump in the United States were strongly 
opposed by many political elites.128 There are, to be sure, legitimate reasons to support both 
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Corbyn and Trump. However, the problems that Citizen Duty aims at addressing (e.g., a 
perception of establishment politicians as corrupt and a disdain for political compromise) are part 
of the reason for these candidates’ success—or so many political elites believe. Elites who fear 
the success of similar anti-establishment candidates or movements may now be more open to 
supporting democratic reforms aimed at addressing the political pathologies that are increasingly 
threatening the established democratic order. France’s Grand Debate, a national deliberative 
consultation implemented by President Macron (partly as a way of defusing the Yellow Vest 
Movement), is an example of such openness to novel deliberative reforms.129 
 Second, citizens’ distaste for participating in Citizen Duty may not be as strong as it first 
appears. Though many citizens admittedly do not particularly want to deliberate about politics, 
as with other aspects of deliberation, institutional design matters. As Michael Neblo and his 
coauthors argue, there is in fact a fairly high willingness among citizens to deliberate about 
politics in certain contexts.130 Citizen Duty would be well-organized and moderated. It would 
have a fairly predictable agenda and would ensure deliberators are compensated for their time. It 
would give citizens information about key relevant topics ahead of time. And its non-local 
character would alleviate fears of social sanctions. Many of these factors have been shown to 
significantly reduce citizens’ distaste for deliberating.131 
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Third, even if most citizens find the prospect of participating in Citizen Duty 
unappealing, this does not imply that they would reject Citizen Duty as an institution. To take an 
analogy, if we only looked only at citizens’ willingness to participate in jury duty, we would 
drastically underestimate its public support. While most citizens are hardly eager to serve as 
jurors,132 they (by and large) support jury duty as an institution due to its perceived social 
benefits.133 Similarly, support for Citizen Duty depends, not only on citizens’ distaste for 
participating in political deliberation, but also on citizens’ perceptions of Citizen Duty’s broader 
benefits. 
These perceived benefits are likely to be substantial. As Hibbing and Theiss-Morse point 
out, many citizens recognize that part of the problem with politics is that ordinary people are 
failing in their civic duty to become politically informed.134 Citizens might therefore be willing 
to support an institution that provides them with an opportunity to discharge this civic duty, at 
least as long as what is asked of them is circumscribed and as long as fellow citizens are 
simultaneously required to do their part as well. Moreover, many citizens are aware of some of 
the problems that Citizen Duty aims to address, such as the increasingly divisive and intolerant 
nature of contemporary politics.135 They may therefore be willing to support an institution aimed 
at addressing these problems.  
Finally, citizens who mistakenly believe in political consensus may actually overestimate 
Citizen Duty’s benefits. They might see Citizen Duty as a way of mobilizing the electorate to 
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pressure the dysfunctional and corrupt representative institutions to implement commonly-
agreed-upon solutions to commonly-agreed-upon problems. Of course, in most cases, these 
citizens’ hopes will prove false given the political disagreement that actually exists in the 
electorate. However, citizens’ pathological underappreciation of political disagreement could 
ironically engender support for a reform like Citizen Duty aimed at addressing this very 
pathology. For all these reasons, Citizen Duty is not as politically utopian as it might first appear. 
 
Conclusion 
Several democratic theorists have called for greater mass electoral deliberation—
deliberation by a large proportion of citizens regarding the issues at stake in elections. However, 
such calls face skepticism about deliberation’s purported benefits, concerns about its dangers and 
costs, and doubts about its political feasibility. 
In response, I have argued that there is a form of mass electoral deliberation—Citizen 
Duty—that offers compelling replies to these objections. Citizen Duty takes seriously the 
challenges of achieving broad participation in constructive deliberation via careful design of the 
deliberative environment, legally-required attendance, trained moderators, and substantial travel 
requirements. I have argued that these measures would enable Citizen Duty to scale up the well-
studied success of Deliberative Polls, thus realizing the promise of mass electoral deliberation.  
Some might dismiss Citizen Duty as too costly. But if society is willing to pay billions of 
dollars and employ coercion for the benefits generated by jury duty, the substantially greater 
benefits of Citizen Duty can justify these costs as well. Others might dismiss Citizen Duty as 
utopian. However, a careful examination citizens’ attitudes towards deliberation and politics 
suggest that this proposed reform is not as quixotic as it might first appear. 
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Many questions remain for future research. What effects would Citizen Duty deliberation 
have on participants? How would Citizen Duty affect (and be affected by) the various elements 
of the broader electoral system? Should Citizen Duty be used in other democratic contexts 
besides presidential elections in the United States (e.g., referenda)? If so, how? My aim in this 
article has been to motivate inquiry into such questions by arguing that Citizen Duty is an idea 
with enormous potential—one that deserves to be taken seriously by those concerned with 
addressing the very serious problems facing contemporary democracies. 
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